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This thesis is directed to scholars of the Spanish Civil War. Acknowledging that
the volume and depth of work already produced by respected scholars cannot be equaled
in a thesis timeframe, I focus in on a few common theories to present a speculative, yet
strong, case for reconsidering Stalin’s role in the Spanish Civil War.
One proposition that should be reconsidered is that Stalin caused the Spanish
Civil War. The internationally respected historian, Stanley Payne provided information to
support what he contended is “…probably a more or less historically accurate judgement”
that the Popular Front policy caused the war in Spain1. Stalin controlled the Communist
International (Comintern) and in 1935 the Popular Front policy was adopted by the
Comintern in Moscow. Both the Popular Front policy and Stalin were integrated into the
Spanish government in the time preceding the Spanish Civil War. Stalin and the Popular
Front policy did not help to avert civil war in Spain, but they did not cause it. There is
sufficient information to acknowledge that the causes of Spanish Civil War had been
building for many years and were mostly of Spanish origin.
                                                
1 Stanley Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism. (London and New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2004), 259.
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It is a known fact the Soviet Union provided aid to the Republican left in Spain
during the civil war. Unfortunately for the Spanish left, Soviet “aid” included: Soviet
“advisors” that undermined cohesiveness in the diverse groups that comprised the
Spanish left, “advisors” who were maneuvered into many key positions in the Spanish
left’s government and military, and enough military support to keep the Spanish left
fighting but never enough for them to win. Military operations required communist,
therefore Stalin’s, approval and support was withheld for military campaigns Stalin
disagreed with. Those of the Spanish left who challenged Stalin’s authority in directing
the civil war were dealt with severely. As the civil war dragged on, different Spaniards
tried to no avail to reduce the power held over them by the Stalin-led communists.
Stalin’s aid went far beyond providing support to become control. An old proverb of
unclear origin seems to apply: “With friends like these, who needs enemies?”
Many historians contend that Stalin’s goal in Spain was not necessarily to support
the Spanish left, but instead was contrived to manipulate Britain into intervening on
behalf of the legally-elected Spanish left’s Republican government, thus dragging Britain
into war. While Hiroaki Kuromiya explained that, “Stalin had hoped that his support of
the Spanish Republicans would help to draw the major Western powers (Britain and
France) and the Soviet Union closer together against Hitler’s Germany.”2 Stanley Payne
presented, “…further testimony to Stalin’s genuine belief that he could make his
policy…compatible with…the Western democracies or at least with encouraging them to
                                                
2 Hiroaki Kuromiya, Stalin: Profiles in Power, (Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2005) 122.
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change their policy toward the Republic."3 Data does not justify serious consideration of
“…Stalin’s genuine belief…” that he could encourage Britain to change their policy
toward the Spanish left’s Republican government.
Stalin’s specific motives and actions cannot be definitively determined due to a
lack of access to his personal information combined with his effective preoccupation with
secrecy.4 “He demanded absolute security, ‘Death solves all problems. No man, no
problem.”5 When Edvard Radzinsky was researching in the Soviet archives, he was
warned that: “Bolshevik documents are peculiar in that wherever they say ‘peaceful
demonstration’ they most probably mean ‘armed uprising,’ The general rule is that ‘yes’
almost invariably means ‘no’.” Radzinsky called this an “in-depth language –a false
bottomed language, in which words have two or three meanings”6 and continued on to
explain that Stalin was a master at this language. If Radzinsky is correct, access to
Stalin’s personal information might not provide the answers we seek; it might remain
impossible to state with absolute certainty what Stalin’s actions and motives were.
Payne’s book, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism, reflects
this uncertainty: “Orlov may first have been placed in charge of coordinating
intelligence…Stalin apparently sent reports…. another top Soviet journalist…was
                                                
3 Stanley Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism. (London and New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2004), 194.
4 Sergei Kudryashov, Stalin and the Allies: Who Deceived Whom, History Today 45, no. 2 (May 1995):
page nr. Retrieved from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kudrya.htm
5 Hiroaki Kuromiya, Stalin: Profiles in Power, (Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2005) 128.
6 Edvard Radzinsky, Stalin, (New York: Anchor Books, 1997), 103
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apparently held back…” [emphasis added]7 Possibilities were presented that, while
speculative in nature, are reasonable and worth considering. The motives and goals
suggested for Stalin in this thesis are likewise speculative, reasonable, and worthy of
consideration.
A common theory is that Joseph Stalin apparently believed that if he could
persuade Spain’s ‘uncontrollable’ left to let him guide the civil war, indefinitely postpone
the social revolution so desired and deserved by Spanish workers, dismantle collectives
designed to share wealth, restore property ownership back to those who originally
ignored the plight of the workers and laborers, or forcibly eliminate “uncontrollable”
elements and implement these changes himself, he could convince Britain to intervene on
behalf of the Spanish left during the civil war. This theory is referenced by Spanish Civil
War scholars as justification for many of Stalin’s ethically and morally questionable
actions during the Spanish Civil War8.
On this subject, Payne accepts that, “To some of the more analytic
scholars…Soviet policy seemed inevitably contradictory: How could a military
intervention by the Soviet Union…really be expected to encourage the capitalist
                                                
7 Stanley Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism. (London and New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2004), 134-5.
8 Burnett Bolloten, The Grand camouflage. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 100; Gerald Brenan,
The Spanish labyrinth. (London, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 324; W. G. Krivitsky, I
Was Stalin’s Spy, (London: The Right Book Club, 1940), 101; Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Civil War,
the Soviet Union, and Communism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), 296; Ronald
Radosh, et al., Spain betrayed. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 20.
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democracies to join in on the same side? Strict logic is definitely against this
proposition…”9
Payne is correct; logic does not support this proposition and archived reports
presented in this thesis do not support it either. Spanish Civil War scholars should reject
the idea that it was possible to encourage Britain to join in this war on the side of the
Spanish left. Spanish military strategy during that time precluded intervening in the
Spanish Civil War, especially on behalf of the Spanish left and significant foreign
investors from both British and United States also opposed the Spanish left’s
government, putting pressure on their governments to resolve their concerns.
Some researchers propose that the impossibility of convincing Britain to become
involved in the Spanish Civil War is irrelevant because Stalin was unaware of this
situation. The proposition states that what is relevant is that Stalin believed it was
possible to pull the British into the Spanish Civil War. “From Stalin’s point of view there
seemed to be a reasonable chance that a massive propaganda barrage…combined with
some salutary political changes in Spain, might divert powerful Western interests…to
focus instead on the geostrategic implications of German influence…”10.
Information presented in this thesis refutes this theory. From Stalin’s point-of-
view there was no reasonable chance that a propaganda campaign combined with
“…some salutary political changes…” would divert British interests. After reviewing
information from diverse sources which are referenced in this thesis, it seems reasonable
                                                
9 Stanley Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism. (London and New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2004), 296
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to conclude that Stalin was well aware of the fact that his actions in Spain could not
possibly convince Britain to intervene on behalf of the Spanish left in this war.
Stalin also understood that Britain was aware of communist influence in Spain
and this influence concerned them. He knew that there was no justification for his
interference in the Spanish left’s government, revolution, and war.
If we accept that Stalin knew he could not manipulate Britain into intervening in
the Spanish Civil War, then we should also accept that Stalin’s invasive and subversive
“aid” to Spain was not provided with the goal of hiding communist influence in Spain or
as part of a master plan to convince Britain to intervene  to back the legally-elected
Spanish left’s government. If this were the case, why would Stalin put so much effort into
pretending he believed in the possibility?  What goals remain to explain Stalin’s
involvement in Spain? Did any countries gain from Stalin’s “aid” to Spain during the
civil war of 1936 –1939?
The Soviet Union also benefited financially from the tons of gold shipped there
from Spain for safe keeping, which was never returned. Pretending to support the Spanish
left was also a valuable ruse. If the Spanish left did not believe that Stalin could provide
some extremely valuable resources, his efforts to manipulate the war by manipulating
them would have quickly failed. Even with the “carrot” of possible British intervention
continually dangled in front of them, many in the Spanish left immediately opposed
                                                                                                                                                
10 Stanley Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism. (London and New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2004), 296.
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Stalin and other joined in the resistance as time passed and Stalin’s “stick” tactics became
less and less tolerable.
Britain benefited from the added length of the civil war since they were concerned
about Mussolini. Military involvement in Spain’s civil war drained Italy’s resources,
diverted Mussolini’s attention away from activities Britain preferred he not be engaged
in, and provided resistance to Stalin’s growing power, which Britain feared more than
Hitler’s.
In addition to the Soviet Union and Britain, there was another country that
benefited from Stalin’s activities in Spain during Spanish Civil War: Germany. The fact
that Stalin’s aid was insufficient to allow the civil war to end but sufficient to keep the
Spanish left fighting suited Hitler’s strategic needs well. Hitler desired a prolonged civil
war in Spain and even directed his German advisors in Spain to pressure Franco into
changing tactics so the war would drag out rather than end it quickly11.
This thesis highlights Germany’s activities in Spain along with Stalin and Hitler’s
relationship before and during the Spanish Civil War to persuade historians and history
scholars to consider that assisting Germany might have been Stalin’s most important goal
in Spain.
In one section of Stanley Payne’s book, Payne comments that “an entire
literature” had been written to show that at the end of the civil war, the Communist
withdrawal was planned by the Communists to shift blame for the final surrender away
from the Soviet Union and Stalin. Payne dismisses this work with a comment that this
8
information is, “primarily in Spanish” and continues on to say that the last book to
present this was written by a “…ninety-year-old Communist propaganda official who had
become a vociferous anti-Communist”12. While this was probably not Payne’s intent,
statements like this can give the impression of rejecting potentially relevant information
by discrediting sources due to their nationality or age. This would be a grave mistake and
one this thesis tries to avoid by allowing multiple voices to speak on this subject.
Combining a variety of perspectives can assist in allowing patterns to appear that
otherwise might not be apparent.
                                                                                                                                                
11 Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain  (London: Penguin Group, 1982), 223.
12 Stanley Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism. (London and New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2004), 282
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CHAPTER II
CAUSES OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR
In ‘Dimitrov and Stalin 1934 – 1943’ edited by Alexander Daltin and F. I. Firsov,
a telegram from Com. Ercoli stated that, “Besterio, (an extreme right Socialist), …
declared recently that the policy of the popular front had caused the war in Spain.”13
Others, including Burnett Bolloten state that, “…the civil war was strictly Spanish in its
Origin. No foreign intervention was necessary to ignite the tinder of social enmity...”14.
As previously mentioned in the introduction, Stanley Payne believed it to be “more or
less accurate” that policies of the Popular Front caused the war. While popular front
policies might have aggravated a tense situation in Spain, they did not “cause” civil war
to break out. Civil war was inevitable.
Conditions for the lower classes in Spain preceding the civil war varied in different
regions, but many experienced sub-standard housing and food supplies that were at times
so meager that some peasants were forced to resort to eating grass15. While many Spanish
poor struggled to survive, the rich had both land and food. The code of the hidalgo ,
which required Spanish gentlemen to despise earning money increased the tension
between social classes.
                                                
13 Alexander Dallin, and F.I. Firsov, Dimitrov & Stalin 1934 – 1943, Letters from the Soviet Archives,
(New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2000), 74.
14 Burnett Bolloten, The Grand camouflage. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 26.
15 Antony Beevor, The Spanish Civil War, (Penguin Books, 2001), 31.
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This situation did not develop in the time just preceding the civil war. The 1788
Spanish census showed 50% of adult males were not involved in any type of productive
work. The army, the church, and the nobility were a dead weight on the rest of the
population16.
No governmental options existed for mediation between these groups to resolve
an intolerable situation. Worker strikes were met with retaliatory mass executions.17 One
might assume that the Catholic Church in Spain would step in to represent the meek who
were supposed to inherit the earth, but the opposite occurred. Spain’s Catholic Church
did little to reduce the misery, “The church was detested by the workers and labourers for
preaching acceptance of poverty while amassing vast riches.”18
A local historian in Palma Del Rio, Spain told a story to try to convey the tension
that existed between the rich and poor in that area. According to this story, the poor in
Palma Del Rio were starving or eating grass while the rich, including a bull rancher
named Marino, lived in luxury. When the Popular Front won the elections, the peasants
in this area believed they had the right to food. They went onto to Marino’s ranch without
his permission, killed some of his bulls (which were raised for bullfighting) and fed
people in the town. Marino left Palma and later returned with the Franco’s Nationalist
army. Marino, with army backing, demanded that all men in town over the age of 16 line
up along a narrow street near the Catholic convent. Marino walked down the line and
pulled out some men out who worked for him or that he personally approved of. The rest
                                                
16 Antony Beevor, The Spanish Civil War, (Penguin Books, 2001), 14.
17 Ibid., 33.
11
of the men were forced in small groups to walk around the corner where they were all
shot and dumped into a mass grave.
After the first execution, the remaining men realized they would be killed and
begged Marino to spare them. His reply was, “You ate my meat.” One father was pulled
out line by Marino only to look back and see his son remaining in the line. The father
begged Marino not to kill his son so Marino kindly offered the father the option to die in
his son’s place, which the father chose to do.
These families from extremely different social classes lived together in the town
of Palma Del Rio long before the civil war and they live together there still. The lower
classes had few choices before, during, or after the civil war. This story gives life to
tension that raw data and facts alone cannot convey. Situations like this were common
and were not caused by Stalin, the Spanish left’s government, or popular front policies.
Franz Borkenau traveled around Spain at the beginning of the civil war and
published his impressions in the book, The Spanish Cockpit. Borkenau echoed Beever’s
concerns about ‘intolerable conditions’ in Spain:
The Government must do something to satisfy the seething masses. But it
attempted the dilatory policy of 1931 over again, unchanged: again there was a
delay of the agrarian reform, again the guardia began shooting insurgent peasants.
Only now the popular resistance was much stronger, feelings more bitter, claims
more decided. In certain districts the peasants began to take the law into their own
hands and to divide the large farms of the aristocrats between them.19
                                                                                                                                                
18 Ibid., 28.
19 Franz Borkenau, The Spanish cockpit (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, The University of Michigan
Press, 1971), 60.
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Neither Stalin, nor the Popular Front government’s policies, caused the Spanish
Civil War. There is sufficient documentation describing sub-standard living conditions
and harsh treatment of the lower classes in Spain to conclude that the wide disparity
between social classes nurtured long-standing desperation on one side combined with
fear and indignation on the other that ultimately erupted in civil war. Perhaps, if the
Catholic Church had been more successful in convincing the workers and labourers to
accept poverty while watching others enjoy wealth, workers’ and peasants’ resistance
might have been weaker, their feelings less bitter, their claims less decided.
Other contributing factors to the outbreak of Spain’s civil war in 1936 were the
rugged terrain combined with limited transportation routes and a weak central
government. This combination led over time to the development of strong regional ties
that were often stronger than ties to their national government. At the time of the Spanish
Civil War, many people never traveled far from their homes and in difficult times had no
one to turn to except their neighbors. Not all Spaniards spoke the same language. In
conditions such as these it is understandable that the elected Spanish left’s Republican
government faced great difficulty in building and coordinating a national defense that
could unite diverse groups and effectively discourage uprisings.
Regional ties are still apparent in Spain. A civil war town meeting was called in
2008 in a small Spanish town called Palma Del Rio, by “Izquierda Unida”, a politically
party supporting the Spanish left. One speaker at the meeting represented the “Izquierda
Unida” and two other speakers supported the communist party. I attended, recorded the
13
meeting20 and a native Spaniard translated it for me. The people at the meeting stated
very strongly that they did not want outsiders telling their history – they want to tell it
themselves.
The people who attended the meeting of the “Izquierda Unida” were correct –
there is a uniquely Spanish element to the Spanish Civil War and this certainly applies to
the causes of this war. While access to information was difficult for many years during
Franco’s time, that situation has changed and many Spanish people want to research and
talk about that time in their country’s history. More should be done to bring Spanish
perspectives into historical debates and discussions regarding the Spanish Civil War.
                                                




One possibility proposed for why Britain might have intervened in the Spanish
Civil War is that the British feared Hitler’s growing power and might have been
convinced to intervene in Spain to counter this growing danger. This idea is not
supportable. When the Spanish Civil War broke out, the British and American
governments were more concerned with the Soviet Union’s growing power than they
were with Germany’s. The British considered Hitler a foreign leader that could provide a
counter weight to offset Stalin’s growing power.
Hitler himself supported this idea in his book Mein Kampf, which stated that
Hitler’s expansionist interests would be focused towards the east. If Britain weakened
Hitler, they allowed Stalin to strengthen. If they allowed Hitler to become a powerful
deterrent, Britain might be able to avoid political tension with Stalin and the Soviet
Union would in turn weaken Hitler. In his book, Hitler expressed the wish to establish a
relationship with Britain and the two countries had more in common than the Soviet
Union and Britain. While the British feared a German invasion, they feared the
communist threat more. The British would not have sided with Stalin to oppose Hitler.
With regards to the situation in Spain, British military strategists’ main concern was with
maintaining Gibraltar.
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In August 1936, one month after the murder of José Calvo Sotelo and the
retaliatory military uprising, Britain’s Committee of Imperial Defence documented their
position on the resulting Spanish Civil War in a report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-
Committee. In this report, they discussed ‘British interests in the Western Mediterranean.
British interests around the Straits of Gibraltar revolved at that time around trade
and communications – maintaining their naval base at Gibraltar was critical. An August
1936 report from the British Committee of Imperial Defence stated that:
…In a war with a European Power it would, therefore, be essential to our interests
that Spain should be friendly, or at worst, strictly neutral. A hostile Spain or the
occupation of Spanish territory by a hostile Power would make our control of the
Straits and use of Gibraltar as a naval and air base extremely difficult, if not
impossible, and would thus imperil Imperial communications by way of the
Mediterranean…
5. Our interests in the present Spanish crisis may therefore be summarised as—
(a) the maintenance of the Territorial integrity of Spain and her possessions
(Balearics, Morocco, Canaries and Rio de Oro);
(b) the maintenance of such relations with any Spanish Government that may
emerge from this conflict as will ensure benevolent neutrality in the event of
our being engaged in any European war.1
Britain defined their strategic course at the onset of the Spanish Civil War as
working to ensure ‘friendly relations’ with ‘any Spanish Government that may emerge.’
British support for the losing side in this conflict would pit them against a victorious
                                                
1 Report 24-264, Report of the committee of imperial defence – august 1936 (British National Archives,
Reproduced from photographic copies in The National Archives of original letters preserved in the Royal
Archives and made available by gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen, Parliamentary Licence
number for reproduction: P2010000166, 1936), Retrieved from http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk doi:
CAB 24-264.
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enemy after the war and since this was not a viable option, Britain could not allow herself
the option of choosing to intervene militarily on behalf of either side in this war. The
August 1936 report also laid down a requirement that, ‘Spain is under an obligation not to
cede any of her rights in her sphere of influence in Morocco to another Power.’
The Committee of Imperial Defence’s report continued with a discussion of
Italy’s involvement in the civil war. The defense committee was concerned that Italy
might attempt to occupy some part of the Spanish Peninsula, but they justified their
entrenched position regarding non-involvement in the conflict with a stated belief that
Spanish pride would make long-term domination by any possible Italian occupation
unlikely. Based on this committee report, if Stalin used propaganda regarding imminent
Italian occupation as leverage to pull a reluctant Britain into military intervention in
Spain, his tactic would have been ineffective.
The August 1936 Committee of Imperial Defence report, reproduced and included
in Appendix A, went on to explain other critical reasons why Britain could not be
persuaded to change her mind on the issue of intervening in the Spanish Civil War:
Mussolini, if determined to exploit the Spanish crisis to his own advantage, will
not be deterred by threats, and only, by the certainty that force, and adequate
force, will be employed against him. We are, therefore, driven to the conclusion
that any action, other than action in the diplomatic sphere, which His Majesty's
Government might take which would effectively thwart his designs, must
inevitably involve a serious risk of war between Great Britain and Italy.   
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… The relative preparedness for war of these two countries has been examined so
exhaustively during the past twelve months that it is unnecessary in this paper to
reconsider the question in any detail. Suffice it to say that Italy is the only Power
whose forces are fully mobilised and available for immediate operations.2
Britain knew that Italy would respond militarily if the British stepped into the
Spanish conflict. The result would be open war with Italy and the Committee for Imperial
Defence’s report clearly shows that the British were all too aware of how ill prepared
they were for such a eventuality:
…we should avoid at all costs the possibility of becoming involved in action
which, on the one hand, fails to achieve our object, and, on the other hand, tends
further to alienate Italy, i.e., we should take no action which we are not prepared
to back up by all the force at our command… the courses of action that appear
advisable are… press for the conclusion and rigid enforcement of a universal
agreement of non-interference in Spain by all European Powers… Support by
France and Russia to the forces of the Spanish Left may well lead Italy to afford
open support to General Franco. 3
The report therefore counters the claim that Stalin ruthlessly controlled the
Spanish left to hide Soviet involvement in Spain. The report established that in August
1936 – only one month after the Spanish Civil War began, Russia’s involvement in Spain
was both a known fact and a concern. Instead of hiding Soviet involvement, Stalin’s
                                                
2 Report 24-264, Report of the committee of imperial defence – august 1936 (British National Archives,
Reproduced from photographic copies in The National Archives of original letters preserved in the Royal
Archives and made available by gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen, Parliamentary Licence
number for reproduction: P2010000166, 1936), Retrieved from http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk doi:
CAB 24-264.
3 Report 24-264, Report of the committee of imperial defence – august 1936 (British National Archives,
Reproduced from photographic copies in The National Archives of original letters preserved in the Royal
Archives and made available by gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen, Parliamentary Licence
number for reproduction: P2010000166, 1936), Retrieved from http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk doi:
CAB 24-264.
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“aid” to the Spanish left helped Franco convince many in the international community to
help him fight what many considered pernicious communist infiltration in Spain.4
The report proves that Britain knew that if they chose to intervene in Spain’s civil
war, they would be forced to confront Italian military forces and in such an eventuality,
the British would lose. Britain’s primary concern was not whether the Spanish situation
might require them to jump into the fray; they were concerned with how to discourage
increased international involvement in this conflict. This goal could not be achieved with
additional British intervention of any kind, but instead by “rigid” strategic non-
intervention while knowingly downplaying the obvious Italian military presence in Spain.
The legally elected Spanish government could be, and would be sacrificed to give the
British time to prepare for war; Stalin was not considered as a potential ally; he was
viewed a complication in the fine art of avoiding premature war.
In the fall of 1936, a few months into the civil war, the Spanish left’s legal
government and its Spanish electorate struggled against odds for survival. The British
Committee of Imperial Defence met, discussed the situation, and issued another secret
report expressing British acquiescence to the Spanish left’s eventual defeat and debating
whether they should begin negotiating with Franco. In the Committee of Imperial
Defence October 30, 1936 report, under the topic of “Gibraltar as a Link in Imperial Air
Communication,” Sir Robert Vansittart discussed how to proceed on additional
construction activities at Gibraltar:
                                                
4 Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain  (London: Penguin Group, 1982), 223.
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…the matter should, in any case, be referred to the Cabinet, owing to the political
issues involved. It was highly probable that a Government led by General Franco
would emerge triumphant from the Civil War, and such a Government would
undoubtedly object to the scheme. It was to be expected that Italy would actively
support them in their objections. He felt, therefore, that it would be better to try to
come to some arrangement with General Franco's Government than to be taken to
court over the matter…
…SIR ROBERT VANSITTART stressed the probability of avoiding delay if we
waited until the Franco Government was established in Spain. General Franco
would, no doubt, want to obtain our assistance and support in many matters, and it
would be a good opportunity to say to him that we were proposing to proceed
with the reclamation scheme then.
SIR SAMUEL HOARE enquired what would happen supposing General Franco
made difficulties. He trusted that this would not mean abandoning the whole
scheme…
The meeting’s report ended with conclusions included the following:
(e) That the best method of carrying through the scheme, whether by proceeding
at once without any reference to Spain or by waiting to negotiate with
whatever Spanish Government emerges from the present Civil War, is a
question of policy which can only be decided by the Cabinet.5
This report, reproduced and included in Appendix B, shows that the British
Committee of Imperial Defence, as early as October 1936, believed that General Franco
was more likely to win the civil war than the government of the Spanish left. The
committee was not just discussing the possibility of a Franco victory; they were already
debating how to negotiate with Franco’s future government. It has already been shown
                                                
5 Report 24-265, Report of the committee of imperial defence – October 29 1936 (British National
Archives, Reproduced from photographic copies in The National Archives of original letters preserved in
the Royal Archives and made available by gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen (Parliamentary
Licence number for reproduction: P2010000166, 1936). Retrieved from
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk doi: CAB 24-265
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that Britain thought it imperative to be friendly with ‘whatever Spanish Government
emerges from the present Civil War’—this October 1936 report presents Britain belief
that Franco would lead that emergent government. No amount of governmental
restructuring from Stalin could make the Spanish left a viable ally to the British during
this war. The British could not allow themselves to be convinced to consider supporting
the Spanish left against Franco.
Not only did Britain reject the idea of considering aligning with the losing side in
this war, they did not prefer for the war to end quickly. Continuation of the Spanish Civil
War benefited the British by providing a diversionary tactic that kept Italy from having
sufficient resources to become a threat in other, more strategically important, areas
around the Mediterranean. In the British Committee of Imperial Defence October 1937
report, Situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, British military leaders
discussed concerns over the possibility an attack on Egypt by Italian forces. The British
Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee expressed confidence that Italy’s involvement in the
Spanish Civil War drained Italy’s resources to a point that it would be unlikely for
Mussolini to attack Egypt. The British would not have intervened to hamper Italy’s
expensive war effort in Spain.
While the information provided in this thesis already provides a strong case
against Stalin’s ability to convince the British to support the Spanish left during the civil
war, there is more supporting evidence.
The October 1937 Committee of Imperial Defense report, Situation in the
Mediterranean and the Middle East, reproduced and included in Appendix C, continues
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on to provide additional justification for accepting this thesis’s proposition that Britain
could not get involved in a confrontation in the Mediterranean area:
(v) The despatch of any forces from this country must inevitably weaken our
position vis-a-vis Germany, and we have always considered that we should
take no action which would result in a diversion of our limited resources from
our main objective, which is the security of this country against German
aggression.6
Just as the British military strategists calculated that involvement in the Spanish
Civil War would drain Mussolini’s resources, this report shows that the British were also
very aware that any involvement in Spain would be a drain on their own time and
resources as well. Germany was growing more aggressive and they could not afford the
luxury of spending valuable time on what they had already determined was a lost cause.
They could not afford to shift limited British resources away from building up their own
country’s critical defense systems. Stalin’s manipulation of the Spanish left’s political
parties, government, and military defense could not alter the basic truth of these facts.
Not only did the British government reject the idea of intervening on behalf of the
Spanish left, they tried to avoid calling attention to Italy’s involvement in Spain’s civil
war. The British government concluded that calling attention to Italy’s involvement in
Spain could endanger the formal non-intervention agreement.7 The British feared a
confrontation with Mussolini and were not willing to risk an early military conflict with
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Italy to support the Spanish left, especially since they had already concluded that the left
would eventually lose the war anyway. Non-intervention decreased the Spanish left’s
ability to defend their government, but it had no deleterious affects on Britain and, as
long as international attention was not drawn to Italian involvement, it provided no
military complications and no hindrance to Franco’s ability to get foreign military aid.
In mid 1937, the Spanish Civil War was nearly at it mid point. The Committee of
Imperial Defence’s report dated July 19378 continued discussion of Britain’s defensive
limitations and the impossibility of fighting all enemies everywhere. The committee
reiterated how critical it was for Britain to set economic priorities focusing only on
preparation for an inevitable direct attack on the United Kingdom by Germany.
In their November 1937 report, the defence committee admonished Britain to
keep to their narrow strategic focus on Britain’s own preparations for response to German
air attacks and expressed consternation that the strength of Britain’s air force was
“seriously below” what calculations indicated was necessary for their own defense9.
The April 1938 report from this committee continued to hammer out this same
line of reasoning by strongly advising against Britain even participating in conversations
regarding the possibility of involvement in war in other nations irregardless of whether
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those nations were potential enemies or allies. The committee recommended that British
diplomats state this position gently to France to “…avoid giving a rebuff…”10 but
strongly advised against giving France or any other country any indication that Britain
could become involved in any another nation’s conflicts. British strategy of non-
intervention in the plight of other countries in order to ensure their own country’s
survival continued in the Committee of Imperial Defence’s report issued in October
193811.
These reports leave no room for ambiguity regarding Britain’s position on the
Spanish Civil War. Britain was not considering becoming involved in the Civil War in
Spain – not at the beginning of the civil war, not in the middle of that war, and not
towards the end.
Many historians claim that if the Spanish left’s various dissenting political groups
could be manipulated, combined, or liquidated to achieve consolidated political power
under Stalin’s control, these changes might have altered Britain’s perception of the
Spanish Left’s government enough to convince the British to intervene in the Spanish
Civil War. As shown in this chapter, this belief is not supported by historical evidence.
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The reports previously quoted provide strong support for this thesis’s position that
it would be a worthwhile exercise to undertake a reevaluation of Stalin’s involvement




When Spanish workers, laborers, and idealists decided to begin a social revolution
against the wealthy in Spain, they pitted themselves against Spanish-owned businesses. .
One Spanish millionaire, Juan March, fled Spain and invested in helping Franco’s
insurgents overthrow the elected Spanish left’s government12. The Spanish left also
alienated foreign countries with investments in Spain they wished to protect.
Even before the civil war began, Spain’s unstable economy was a source of
irritation to international capitalists. The Spanish left’s government nationalized many
businesses, so private ownership and investment in businesses declined. International
businesses, including those in Britain and the United States, were frustrated with
continual difficulties in attempting to negotiate a stable business environment with the
elected government. Franco provided more stability and Germany was considered
capitalistic. Many of these foreign investors turned away from the elected Spanish
government and overtly or covertly supported Franco’s nationalist uprising. The
president of the Texas Oil Company diverted five tankers to Franco-controlled ports.
Standard Oil of New Jersey supported Franco, as did Ford, Studebaker, Dupont, and
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General Motors. Covert methods of support to Franco included disrupting trade and
delaying bank credit10.
In his working paper, International Capital before "capital internationalization"
in Spain, 1936-1959, Julio Tascón presented data on foreign investments in Spain.
According to Tascón, when the Spanish Civil War began, Germany had ‘foreign interest’
in Spanish banks, telegraph and electricity, chemicals, explosives, shipbuilding and
mines.13 In 1933, with the rise of the Nazi government, Germany’s investments in Spain
increased due to their need for a continuing supply of raw material imports.14 The
Spanish left’s movement towards collectivization conflicted with Hitler’s national
interests in Spain and plans for rebuilding, and rearming Germany would have influenced
Hitler’s immediate decision to provide military support for the Spanish-right insurgents.
It is significant to note that later, even after representatives of British companies
in Spain called their government’s attention to the fact that Germany was ensuring that
Germany received the all Spanish raw materials they needed to prepare for war while
effectively blocking Britain’s ability to acquire enough of the same raw materials to meet
                                                
13 Julio Tascón, International Capital before "capital internationalization" in Spain, 1936-1959, Center for
European Studies Working Paper No. 79, Departamento de Economia Universidad de Oviedo 33071
Oviedo, Spain, n.d.)
14 US Civilian Agency Records RG 84. State Department and Foreign Affairs Records -- Records of the
Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State (RG 84) Spain. (U.S. National Archives. n.d.). Retrieved
from http://www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/finding-aid/civilian/rg-84-spain.html doi: RG 84.
27
British needs for military preparation, the British government still refused to respond in
Spain with a show of military force.15
While the British Committee for Imperial Defence was concerned about
Germany, many of the British bourgeoisie were initially comfortable with the idea of
Germany rearming because they assumed Germany would ‘direct their aggressiveness
against the Soviet Union.16 Sumner Wells, U.S. Secretary in 1937, wrote later that
American financial and commercial interests at that time viewed a confrontation between
Germany and Russia as “favorable” to U.S. interests by defeating Russia and weakening
Germany.17 Based on this information, Stalin could not have used a fear of Germany’s
rearming to tip the scales in British decisions to avoid involvement in the Spanish Civil
War.
British holdings in Spain included natural resources (such as Rio Tinto),
manufacturing, and utilities. U.S. companies in Spain included ITT. Douglas Little
clearly outlined how U. S. and British companies grew increasingly concerned with the
Spanish left’s restrictive and inconsistent government policies, lack of control, and
acceptance of interference directed from Moscow. Concerns were raised in late 1930 and
continued up to and beyond the beginning of the civil war. These concerns included, but
were not limited to: excessive tariffs, export obstacles, unreasonable regulations,
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expropriations without adequate indemnification, and possible soviet subversion of the
Spanish left’s government, and worker-caused stoppages.18 In August 1936, strikers
killed the Spanish directors of some companies19 and while no foreign directors were
mentioned, the instability in Spain under the Spanish-left government was of
international concern.
These complicated foreign interests in Spain precluded Stalin from convincing
Britain to intervene on behalf of the Spanish left government; British intervention would
have placed Britain in conflict with Germany, a country they were not yet willing or able
to confront. Intervention on behalf of the Spanish left in the civil war would have strained
relations with the U.S. government, U.S. corporations, and Britain’s own corporations.
Since Britain was suspicious of Communist subversion in the Spanish left’s government
and had little to no confidence in that government’s ability to control diverse elements in
their country or conduct reliable business agreements, there was very little to gain and
much to lose by such an action.
Rather than debating whether to support the elected government, there is reason to
believe that the British Rio Tinto company might actually have aided Franco’s rebels.
The chief of the rebel air force claimed that the American Telegraph company aided the
Franco rebels by setting up communication links between Madrid and Franco in the
Canary Islands20.
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CHAPTER V
SOVIET SPIES IN BRITAIN
Is it probable that, even if it were not possible to persuade Britain to intervene in
the Spanish Civil War, Stalin continued believe in the feasibility of this goal because his
belief was based on limited British military intelligence information he had in his
possession? Obviously, since the British Committee of Imperial Defence reports were
highly secret, they were not commonly available. This scenario is not probable because
evidence supports this thesis’s contention that Stalin had access to secret Committee of
Imperial Defence reports.
Stalin made a comment in meeting of the Politburo in late August 1936,  “A
friendly Spain was vital to Paris and London.”21 Stalin’s choice of words echo similar
statements contained in a Committee of Imperial Defence report:  “Our position at
Gibraltar has for many years been based on a continuation of friendly relations with
Spain. Apart from the risk of any foreign intervention, should a Government inimical to
Britain, whether Fascist or Communist, emerge from the present struggle, the question of
the security of our base at Gibraltar will require serious examination.”22 In August 1936,
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just a few months after the civil war began, Stalin apparently knew that Britain needed a
friendly Spain.
Donald Duart Maclean was an infamous soviet spy, part of the “Cambridge Five”
who worked in the British foreign office. British secret service archive information KV-
2-805, Information Obtained From General Krivitsky During His Visit to this Country,
January – February 1940, states that:
From his description of photographic prints of documents he saw in Moscow on
two or three occasions in 1936 and 1937 there is no doubt that printed reports of
the Committee of Imperial Defence and other highly confidential reports available
to the same source were regularly made available to and photographed by Ogpu
agents in London…Reports supplied by the ‘Imperial Council’ source were
specially dealt with in Moscow. The printed report…was translated literally into
Russian.23
While Krivitsky has been rejected by some as an unreliable source, some of his
questionable allegations have been shown to be accurate, based on declassified soviet
archival documents.24 Also noteworthy is that the United States Central Intelligence
Agency’s website, listing books of interest to intelligence professions along with book
reviews, included this comment in a review provided by Hayden B. Peake, curator of the
CIA’s historical Intelligence Collection on a book by Gary Kern on Krivitsky: “… the
FBI declined to investigate his [Krivitsky’s] counterintelligence claims. Had they done
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so, Alger Hiss, the atom spies, the Cambridge Five, and many other moles in our
government, all of whom were neutralized after the war—would have been
identified…”25
The British secret service found much of the information provided to them by
Krivitsky reliable and useful. They did not blindly take Krivitsky’s word for truth without
verification; they compared Krivitsky’s description of the documents to the actual
reports. The British Archives’ Security Service file on Krivitsky includes a document
containing the following comment on Krivitsky, “We are satisfied that KRIVITSKY’s
statements are true and made in good faith…H.M.G. Jebb, Esq., Foreign Office.”26
Another document in the British Secret Service file on Krivitsky stated that:
In the autumn of 1939 …M.I.5. were reopening investigations into the activities
in this country of a known Soviet agent, a Dutchman living at the Hague. These
investigations had progressed so far that it appeared that in 1936 this Dutchman
was closely associated with certain Foreign Office officials from whom he was
receiving secret documents from which he made photographic copies for
transmission to Moscow…27
The British Secret Service and British Foreign office both documented the fact
that soviet spies regularly sent reports of the British Committee of Imperial Defence to
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Stalin in 1936 and 1937. Based on their expertise in this area and their belief in the
accuracy of the information provided, it is a reasonable proposition that Stalin had copies
of the reports discussing Britain’s position on the Spanish Civil War.
British archives show that soviet spies had infiltrated their foreign office.
According to information published on the website of ABC-CLIO, Donald Duart
Maclean began working at British Foreign Office in 1934 and continued to work there as
a soviet spy in the foreign office until 1951, well past the end of the Spanish Civil War28.
Maclean was known to have been a Soviet spy during the time of the Spanish Civil War.
He sympathized with the Spanish left and would have known that Britain had no plans to
come to their aid.
Soviet spies regularly sent British Committee of Imperial Defence reports to
Stalin in 1936 and 1937. In 1938, British Cabinet meeting minutes documented concerns
over their awareness of possible leakage of British military weakness and planning
information to their enemies.29
Information in the British Committee of Imperial Defence reports during this time
also described Britain’s position on the Spanish Civil War and why they could not
intervene, especially on behalf of the Spanish left’s Republican government.
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It should be kept in mind that Stalin would have also understood the value of
having access to information that the British believed was secret. Since the British
documents were believed to be ‘secret’, the Spanish Left would not be aware of Britain’s
position and the British were unlikely to correct any statements made by Stalin regarding
British strategy in Spain for fear of ‘showing their hand’ or divulging secret information.
Stalin could freely make claims that if the Spanish left allowed him to derail their
revolution and manipulate their civil war, Stalin might to be able to persuade the British
to intervene on their behalf – no one would dare to correct him.
Some contend that even if Stalin knew Britain could not be convinced to
intervene on behalf of the Spanish left, he would have ignored the evidence and
continued plotting to find a way to convince them anyway. From the perspective of
United States Army historians this highly unlikely. The following is an excerpt from a
military book on the operational art of war:
Soviet Army theorists and practitioners sought systematic explanations for the
complexities underlying victory and defeat in modern war. Armed with an
ideology that emphasized theory and scientific method in military affairs, they
brought new perspective to the study of military history and refreshing rigor to
views on the nature of possible future war, including the conduct of operations.
By the late 1920s they had emerged with an altered view of the constituent
components of military art, and it is to this period-a golden age of military
thought-that we owe the origins of our basic understanding of operational art…
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Although the Soviets did not ignore other operational issues, the theory and
practice of deep operations occupied center stage for Soviet operational art during
the 1930s. Operational art required the practitioner to:
 Identify strategic objectives within theater.
 Visualize a theater in three dimensions.
 Determine what sequence of military actions-preparation, organization,
support, battles, and command arrangements-would bring the attainment
of those objectives.
…The Soviets were distinctive for the following reasons: ...They worried
obsessively about linking separate aspects of their thought about the changing
nature of operations to larger and smaller military realities. 30
Therefore, according to United States military historians, Stalin was not naïve
when the Spanish Civil War began. At that moment in time, Stalin was experiencing a
“golden age of military thought” when he would have obsessively plotted to link Soviet
military strategy to the military realities in the area of military conflict. The Soviet Army
suffered from the purges, but the Soviet military strategists were purged after their
involvement in the Spanish Civil War, “Soviet operational maneuver concepts and forces
suffered severe damage in the late 1930s, in part because Stalin purged their creators.”31
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Khrushchev repeated this claim in his Secret Speech delivered at the Twentieth
Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956:
“…the cadre of leaders who had gained military experience in Spain and in the Far East
was almost completely liquidated….”32 These leaders were militarily involved in the
Spanish Civil War, gained experience there, and then were purged. Stalin used and
benefited from Soviet military strategists’ knowledge and expertise during Spain’s civil
war.
If these U.S. Army historians were correct, Stalin would not have blindly ignored
secret intelligence reports that conclusively proved that the British could not be
convinced to intervene on behalf of the Spanish left in their civil war.
Stalin’s involvement in the Spanish Civil War should to be reevaluated after
eliminating the assumption that Stalin believed he could convince Britain to intervene in
this war. Then, with these blinders off, new possibilities regarding Stalin’s role in the
Spanish Civil War become more open to discussion and debate.
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RESPONSE TO THE 1936 MILITARY UPRISING
When the Spanish Civil War broke out in July 1936, the Spanish workers needed
and expected government action but they were to be disappointed. The government of the
Spanish left delayed attempts to put the rebellion down, preferring to negotiate to avoid a
civil war. In many cases, even after it was clear that civil war could not be avoided, the
Spanish government refused to arm the those who had voted for the government.
Reports on the early days of the Spanish Civil War often describe unrestrained
workers racing around madly, searching cars and strangers for possible weapons. These
descriptions give the impression of a group of crazed people acting without reason or
ethics. In The Spanish Civil War, Abel Paz, who was one of those workers, presents the
events at the beginning of the civil war from the workers’ perspective:
Ever since the victory of the united left wing in the parliamentary elections of
February 1936, the tramp of jackboots had been getting closer. But the
government appeared to be trying not to notice. It gave the impression of being
more scared of the workers than the military. As a result, many of those present
were convinced that neither the Madrid government nor the Generalitat in
Catalonia would arm the workers. If we were unarmed, it would be a massacre; if
we made no effort to resist, the result would be the same anyway. If we were
going to die – or so the word went around – it was better to die fighting…
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The message given to the comrades assembled there was this: that the government
refused to arm the people, and that, as the critical confrontation was certain to
take place that very night, everyone was to arm himself as best he could, by
raiding gun stores or by any other means.33
Paz’s perspective on the reaction of the government was shared by José Peirats, a
member of the Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI), “The government either lacked arms
or feared to arm the people.”34 Justifiably terrified workers were abandoned by their
elected governmental leaders at the critical moment.
If Stalin wanted to effectively assist the Spanish Republic, this was the moment to
step in and provide some advice and arms, but Stalin was silent. Paz describes directions
coming from within the CNT (the AnarchoSyndicalist labor organization)35, which would
help to explain the continued resistance experienced later when the government, under
Stalin’s direction, attempted to consolidate diverse group, including the CNT under
centralized government control. Once again local workers were given more protection
and direction from their local labor organizations than from their centralized government.
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CHAPTER VII
STALIN’S AID TO SPAIN
After the time for immediate, decisive, effective action had passed, Stalin
agreed to provide assistance to the elected Spanish government.1 Stories vary to some
degree, but converge along the line that Stalin’s decision to support the Spanish left
‘coincided’ with the left’s decision to send tons of gold to Russia for safekeeping and
for ensuring the ability to purchase arms from Russia. What the Spanish left purchased
with this gold was a prolonged agonizing war. Even General Franco commented on
the deceptive situation in early January 1938:
Do the songs of the mermaids in the red zone say nothing to you? Do you not
foresee the false voices of compassion and fellowship? Does it not cause you
alarm the apparent patriotism of the new red propaganda? Do you not see in it
the criminal effort to drag to death your conquered youth and new artifact to
deceive the world?2
While Franco was not shy about using the media for propaganda campaigns, his hatred
of Communism was sincere and justified.
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There are many examples of how the arms Stalin supplied to Spain in
exchange for gold were over-priced.3 Arms shipments were also sporadic, arms were
often obsolete,4 weapons were shared unequally between Communist and non-
communist groups,5 weapons varied in munitions requirements so munitions of
varying caliber were required, and some weapons were missing pieces (such as rifles
with no bolts). It has been claimed that largest shipments of arms from the Soviet
Union were received in Spain in autumn of 1936. It has also been said that arms
received by the Spanish in the autumn and winter of 1936 –37 were of ‘limited
utility’6. If both of these statements are true, then it appears that the largest shipments
of arms from the Soviet Union were of limited utility. These are not the actions of a
country with serious intentions to help the Republicans win the civil war.
Once Soviet “advisors” were placed in key positions in the Spanish
government and military, Stalin was accused of not taking the risks needed to
end the war, of encouraging dissention between the different factions in the
Spanish left thus reducing the left’s military effectiveness, of refusing support
for military missions that might have been effective, and of prolonging the
war.7
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When one Spanish leader, Prieto, planned a military mission that Stalin
disagreed with, “It was later rumored that orders had been given [from Stalin] to
liquidate Prieto if he persisted.”8 The Soviets build prisons in Spain where
troublemakers were sent, including some of the famous international brigades
volunteers. Some of the international volunteers who died in Spain were not killed by
Franco-led insurgents. They were instead killed by the country that came to “aid” the
Spanish left’s government  – the Soviet Union led by Stalin. Passports from those who
were killed were collected and later used by the Soviets.9
Stalin’s strategy involving “aid” to the Spanish left was continued even after
the Spanish left no longer wanted Soviet aid and was well past the point of preferring
surrender to continued war. Some refer to actions such as these as constituting Stalin’s
‘counterrevolution’ while others refute that term. Whatever term is applied to Stalin’s
Spanish Civil War strategy, it was clearly ineffective in regards to helping the elected
government of Spain win the civil war.
When the justification of attempting to manipulate military events to position
Spain for British intervention is removed, determining Stalin’s motivation for these
actions requires more analysis. If Stalin did not care if the Spanish left won the war,
why prolong it? Perhaps the time gained by prolonging the Spanish Civil War was
being used productively elsewhere.
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Payne contends that at one point in the civil war, ‘…the Soviet Union became
momentarily interested in playing the Moroccan card in order to gain British and
French assistance…the Soviets strove to persuade Alvarez del Vayo that it might be
useful to cede the Moroccan protectorate to Britain and France in return for their
action to en the German and Italian intervention.”10 This would seem a reasonable
strategy except that Stalin’s spies had provided him with secret British military-
strategy information that stated unequivocally that Spain was not to cede any territory
in Morocco or the Canary Islands to any foreign power. Stalin pushed the Spanish left
into an action that he most likely knew could do nothing to allay British concerns;
instead the action would further alienate Britain.
This offer was made and, of course, was refused since Britain’s Committee of
Imperial Defence had insisted that no Spanish territory be offered to any another
country. It is interesting that when Morocco offered to fight for the Spanish left if that
government would allow Morocco to become an independent state, the idea was,
“…angrily rejected by Moscow’11 Stalin supported offering Moroccan territory in
exchange for military support when he knew that the offer would be refused and
rejected a similar offer when it had a real chance for acceptance.  This is not the
strategy of someone who was genuinely trying to help the elected Spanish government
win a civil war.
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Stalin’s motives during the Spanish Civil War were questionable and
questioning his motives became more and more unacceptable as the war progressed.
When Franz Borkenau returned to Spain for the second time during the Spanish Civil
War, freedom of speech was more limited. Borkenau was watched, warned, then
arrested. After responding to the most of the charges, Borkenau wrote: “One charge
remained; I had described in detail the political pressure the Russians had brought to
bear upon Spain in exchange for the help they had been given. If it was a crime to
mention this fact, then I was guilty.”12
Borkenau was more fortunate than he might have realized at the time. Under
Soviet direction, a system of prisons were set up in Spain for the “…execution of
foreigners and members of the International Brigades whom the Soviets wished to
discipline or liquidate, as well as a growing number of native Spaniards...”13. Stalin’s
involvement delayed the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War and ensured swift
elimination of those who got in the way.
Stalin directed many of the actions that increased tensions among the groups
supporting the elected Spanish left government. Jesús Hernández, who was a
Communist minister in the Spanish left’s government explained one method the
Communists used during the civil war to exacerbate tensions between the groups of
the Spanish left:
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…Today we supported this one in his fight against that one, tomorrow we
would reverse the roles and support the latter, while today, tomorrow, and
always we pushed some against others to their mutual destruction, a game that
we practiced…14
While Hernandez later took limited regretful responsibility for his actions, he also
acknowledged that Stalin was directing this performance.
If the rationalization for Stalin’s behavior, the idea that he was trying to
forcibly position the Spanish left to successfully negotiate with the British for
intervention, is removed from the analysis, what possible alternative reasons could
explain Stalin’s actions during the Spanish Civil War? This should be more closely
analyzed.
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After the German-Russian alliance in 1939, Churchill pondered on the date
Stalin first decided to align with Hitler. I think it a more apropos exercise to ponder
what time before 1939 Germany and Russia not in some way connected. For years,
Hitler used anti-communist slogans to his own advantage just as Stalin used anti-Nazi
slogans. Fear of a common enemy is a great motivator, but there is evidence that
neither Hitler nor Stalin was actually concerned.
Hitler knew that anti-Communism was popular in many countries and he used
this fear to his benefit: “In sum: anti-Communism was an important instrument of
Hitler’s statesmanship.”15. However, during this same time, Germany minister of
foreign affairs, Kuhlmann communicated to the German ambassador in Moscow that,
‘It is in our best interests that the Bolsheviks should remain in power….If you need
more money telegraph the amount.’16
For Stalin, the fear of Germany and Nazis was also quite useful. “If Hitler had
not existed Stalin would have had to invent him. The threat of Hitler, the threat of
intervention, conferred on him [Stalin] enormous powers.”17 This threat also provided
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a useful diversion. By focusing his opponents’ attention on Hitler and the danger he
presented, Stalin kept them from looking too closely at Soviet activities.
The tactic of misleading his opponents was a familiar and effective ploy:
“Stalin succeeded in continuously misleading his allies during the war years. To a
certain extent this made it easier for the scale and strength of his power to escape
Western notice. Some politicians simply lost their sense of reality.”18
While many were convinced that Germany and Russia would not have
negotiated with each other prior to 1939, some believe that relations between these
two countries continued through the Spanish Civil War.19 Serious concerns regarding
the relationship between these two countries were expressed long before the Molotov–
Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939.  In 1932, Cecil F. Melville wrote a book warning
about, “…Germany’s two faces, the one turned toward Western Europe, the other
turned towards Soviet Russia.”20 Melville’s book, The Russian Face of Germany
exposed how Stalin helped Germany re-arm in defiance of the Versailles Treaty with
Germany in charge of the technical aspects while Russia providing a location outside
Germany.21 Melville’s book described a Junkers airplane factory in Russia and a
poison gas factory was constructed in Trotsk, put he warned also about the future
directions of the German-Russian relationship.22
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In spite of the fact that since 1926 Germany has been released from the
restrictions in the construction of high-power-engine-aeroplanes…this system
of concealing military collaboration with Russia is still being continued by the
German Government.23
Documentation of German-Russian military ties includes website information
published by Mahlon G. Kelly, Professor Emeritus from University of Virginia, on
Carl Zeiss of the Carl Zeiss industrial complex. According to Professor Kelly, the
Soviet Union contracted with Carl Zeiss in 1936 to “…set up a microscope production
plant in Leningrad…”24 Company Seven, a resource for the international astronomical
community and a registered U.S. Department of Defense contractor, provided
additional information on the Carl Zeiss industrial complex’s ties to the Soviet Union.
The historical section of Company Seven’s website supports Melville’s and Professor
Kelly’s claims, describing the Carl Zeiss industrial complex as being “generally
supportive of the NAZI regime” and then described the firm’s activities in Russia:
From shortly before World War I up to World War II the Carl Zeiss firm
established subsidiaries in European countries to produce optics. Particularly
between the wars some of these companies produced military optics
(binoculars for example) which if made in Germany might have aroused
international concern. It is not unusual to find the traditional Zeiss trademark
with the city of origin in place of "Jena" listed as "Petersburg" Russia, … It is
ironic that some of the equipment manufactured by Zeiss subsidiaries in other
European countries might have been employed to equip the Wehrmacht and SS
armies…25
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According to this combined information, Stalin invited Carl Zeiss, a Nazi supporter, if
not a zealous Nazi supporter, to the Soviet Union in 1936 where they set up
manufacturing support that “ironically” might have been designed for producing Nazi
military equipment.
The following two German memos document that Germany and Russia
renewed business agreements during the Spanish Civil War requiring Russia to
provide Germany with critical raw materials:
[Memo dated January 10, 1938] In order to insure larger raw material imports
from the Soviet Union in 1938 at the outset, we have requested that the
Russians submit a list to us of those goods which they intend to order in
Germany in 1938 and have promised them far-reaching concessions in
supplying this list… According to …Minister President General Goring, we
are even prepared to make further concessions in those fields where we have
previously refused to make any…26
[Memo dated February 21, 1938] The Economic Treaty for 1937 could not be
renewed for 1938 on time… The deliveries and orders from Russia, therefore,
have been at a standstill since the end of 1937, to the detriment of the German
economy… it is important for us in these negotiations to maintain and, if
possible, to increase the raw material purchases from Russia.27
Cooperation between Stalin and Hitler during the Spanish Civil War is also
supported by a Yale University webpage, German-Soviet Cooperation & Soviet Tanks
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in the Spanish Civil War28, which lists research documents on, “…all aspects of the
Red Army's collaboration with the Reichswehr. The materials range from 1918 to
1938…” It is interesting to note that this range of dates extends into the first three
years of the Spanish Civil War.
A Spanish minister during the civil war, Zugazagoitia, wrote after the war
about fearfully noticing German-Soviet cooperation during that war. Zugazagoitia
described indications of possible Gestapo involvement in the retaliation against the
Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (POUM), a Marxist group Stalin wished to
liquidate during the Spanish Civil War29, 30.
Stalin’s involvement extended, rather than shortened the duration of the
Spanish Civil War. That situation met Hitler’s needs at that time. Hitler preferred the
civil war to extend out rather than end quickly31, “an extended war suited his [Hitler’s]
purposes better”32 When German military commanders brought complaints to Hitler
about how slow the war was going, “…he brushed them aside, for Franco’s seemingly
dilatory tactics suited the Fuhruer very well.”33
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Stalin’s tactics in the Spanish Civil War served Hitler well. For example,
Soviet arms were not sent immediately after war broke out, when some believed a
quick response could end the war quickly. As explained earlier, when the soviet arms
finally arrived in Spain, there were not enough to win the war, only delay its
conclusion34, 35.
Some Spaniards suspected plotting between Russian and Germany against
Spain before 1939. In Claudio Sanchez Albornoz’s memoirs, he recalled that, “…I
have heard Asua describe how…he learned…about the negotiations between the
governments of Stalin and Hitler, which were preparing the betrayal of the Spanish
Republic. And he could not make the Negrin government believe him.”36 Burnett
Bolloton also believed in this possibility:  “…it is most likely that Stalin, quite early in
the Spanish Civil War, had in mind the idea of striking a bargain with Hitler…”37
Indalecio Prieto describes a situation during the Spanish Civil War where the
Communists blocked a retaliatory mission:
The day the German squadron bombed the Almeria Port [1937-05-31] I
quickly met …to propose to them an aerial attack… that could have been very
large…  They suspended the Consejo without reaching an agreement to meet
again with the president …When the Consejo resumed it was Mr. Uribe
[Communist minister], … who came before everyone to oppose my suggestion
… He and his partner Mr. Jesús Hernández [Communist minister] …had
already received the order from the Russian Ambassador.  Today, after the
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Hitler-Stalin pact, the attitude of the communist ministers is understood, that
which I found unexplainable on that dramatic morning.38
In March 1938, when Spanish president Azana wanted to find a way to
negotiate an end to the civil war, Horiato Prieto accused the Spanish government of
playing a Russian game that was destroying Spain39. Under Communist pressure, the
war continued.
In Franco’s book, Palabras del Caudillo, the press asked Franco why the
Spanish left had not surrendered when they were experiencing such desperation.
Franco replied that, “The only explanation is the absence of patriotism and the
criminal spirit of the red leaders.”40
Another plausible explanation is that Hitler wanted Spain’s civil war to
continue on while he removed raw materials from Spain. Was Stalin able to pretend to
help one side of a conflict while actually assisting the opposite side? According to
Stanley Payne, “The Communists played a double role …but that had been their
standard procedure since 1917” Payne states that, “…the evidence is clear that…Stalin
hoped to play both ends against the middle.” 41
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In May 1938, the Soviet policy of prolonging the civil war continued against
the wishes of many in the Spanish government who were in favor of ending the war42,
43
Shifts in both Stalin’s and Hitler’s interest in the Spanish Civil War began in
1938. In July 1938, a verbal agreement was reached between Germany and the Soviet
Union to end press attacks on each other’s chiefs of state and a Soviet foreign minister
began to openly discuss the benefits of withdrawing from Spain.  A verbal agreement
between Soviet foreign minister Litvinov and German Ambassador von der
Schulenburg was made in mid 1938 to the effect that, “the press in the two powers
would cease personal attacks on each other’s chiefs of state…” and then further
explained that, “The Soviet foreign minister now ‘considered it best to withdraw from
the Spanish venture…”44
Hitler and Stalin stopped using fear of each other to manipulate others -- they
seemed to stop noticing each other.45 Stalin directed the actions of his ministers,
therefore it appears that in mid 1938, Stalin had begun to implement a German –
Soviet alliance.
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Stalin was sent a memo in August 1938 detailing food shortages and Spanish
people close to starvation46. In August 1938, a Soviet decision was made to withdraw
remaining volunteers from Spain and the Spanish government would no longer be
allowed to purchase supplies from Russia on credit47. The Munich agreement in
September 1938 coincided with a call from the ComIntern, which was controlled by
Stalin, for withdrawal of foreign troops48. While many believe that the Munich
agreement angered Stalin and caused him to shift alliances, that view is not shared by
Edvard Radzinsky, who believed that the Munich agreement gave Stalin the
justification for what he was already preparing to do – openly shift political
alliances49.
Hitler’s interest in the continuation of the Spanish Civil War also declined in
1938. Franco had been forced to give Hitler 60-75% equity in 4 of the 5 main Montana
Companies in exchange for military support for Franco’s final war campaign50. In late
October 1938, Hitler told the French Ambassador in Berlin that Spain had provided
some, “economic advantages” but that Hitler had no permanent plans there and
recommended that it was at that time in France’s best interests to pull French
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volunteers out of Spain and let Franco win51. In December of 1938, Hitler began to
express his desire to see the civil war concluded “as soon as possible.”52.
While Stalin encouraged the Spaniards to fight to the last Spaniard, communist
leaders prepared to finally leave Spain to the Spaniards53. Interestingly, even as Stalin
prepared to leave, he stepped up his efforts to liquidate members of the POUM and
Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI).
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If those in Spain with wealth and power had reduced the disparity between the
rich and poor before the later were so desperate just for the basics needed for
continued existence, the left would not have been placed in a situation where they had
nothing to lose by courting Stalin. The scenario that played out during the Spanish
Civil War could have happened in another country and could happen again.
After meeting with Stalin at the end of WWII, General Marshall concluded that
Stalin planned to focus his political efforts on countries torn apart by war. General
Marshall immediately started working to provide aid to help Europe rebuild, a United
States initiative that became known as the Marshall Plan – because General Marshall
accurately concluded that desperation is a situation best avoided.54  Other contributing
causes of the war were also of Spanish origin such as a lack of good roads for transportation
that encouraged regional, rather than national allegiances. More should be done to encourage
Spanish scholars to join in the international debate and discussion.
Britain could never have been convinced to come to the aid of the Spanish left during
their civil war. They would have been more likely to support Franco against the Spanish
left. Stalin expressed concerned that if Britain did intervene in the Spanish Civil War,
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they might intervene in support of Franco against the Spanish left55. This scenario fits
with Britain’s frustration with the Spanish left’s inability to provide a stable
international business environment.
 The government of the Spanish left, made up of groups that did not like each
other, encouraged poor and starving people that serious inequities would be addressed,
then abandoned them at a moment of crisis, alienating their own constituency. This
same government had policies, supposedly for the very people they abandoned, that
alienated groups, companies, and countries who could have provided assistance in
time of need and yet the government remained too politically naïve to realize what
they had done. They did, however, have tons of gold and no one to sell them arms in
exchange for that gold.
Stalin has been described as enjoying responding to situations like he was
playing a game of chess, playing both sides and/or playing groups against each other
and “moving in opposite directions simultaneously”56. From this perspective, the
Spanish Civil War game would be game too enticing to pass up: a country desperate
for help, much to gain by getting involved, and little to lose.
Stalin manipulated the Spanish left into sending him their gold because it was
so easy to do. Having read the reports of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Stalin
knew that the British were not going to intervene in Spain and that the Spanish left
would most likely lose the war eventually. He could have justified taking the Spanish
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government’s gold on the grounds that the left would most likely have lost it at the end
of the war anyway. None of the gold shipped to the Soviet Union was ever returned.
The Soviet Union claimed that they deserved to keep it to offset their financial losses
in Spain, but the Soviet Union suffered no financial loss over the Spanish Civil War.
Payne proposed that:
…the wartime Republic paid its own way, and both the Soviet Union and the
French Communist Party probably turned a profit on their activities on its
behalf…Soviet suppliers saw the desperate condition of the Republican forces
as an opportunity to eliminate obsolete Soviet stocks of World War I and even
older equipment…prices were inflated…30 to 40 percent above the
international market rate…The Republican government was billed for all
salaries and expenses of Soviet personnel, their dependents, and their
vacations…57
Stalin respected strength and resolve. He admired Ivan the Terrible58 and
expressed admiration for Hitler after the “night-of-the-long-knives.” Stalin’s official
policy was to assist the elected government of Spain, but he would not have respected
such a weak government nor would he have believed they deserved respect.
Someone Stalin did respect and fear was Hitler. Stalin and Hitler were not
enemies in 1936 – they were partners during the Spanish Civil War. Hitler needed raw
materials found in Spain to help Germany prepare for war. The Spanish left’s
government would not have allowed Hitler to take them, so Hitler traded Franco
military support for raw materials.
                                                                                                                                            
56 Edvard Radzinsky, Stalin, (New York: Anchor Books, 1997), 337.
57 Stanley Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism, (London and New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2004). 152 – 157.
58 Edvard Radzinsky, Stalin, (New York: Anchor Books, 1997), 317.
57
Hitler needed the civil war to last long enough to extract the raw materials,
ship them out of Spain. Stalin provided Hitler with that time.  Hitler also ensured that
the majority of Spain’s raw materials went to Germany rather than Britain, even
though Britain owned some of the companies involved. Hitler’s final move was to
trade the final support Franco needed for control of raw material producing
companies. When he had enough raw materials extracted and had this agreement in
place; Hitler was ready for the Spanish Civil War to end.
As a good partner, Stalin ensured the civil war continued long enough for
Hitler to extract from Spain the materials he needed. Stalin offered support to people
who were desperate with few options. Then Stalin distracted many people in Spain, as
well as many in other nations, from looking too closely at German economic
maneuvers or Soviet political activities in Spain by creating a diversion combined of
playing the “look at what Germany is doing militarily in Spain” card, touting Stalin’s
unique genius in being able to persuade Britain to intervene in the war, and by
dangling the idea that British intervention was just around the corner, if only the
Spanish left allowed Stalin to control their government and their war. Did General
Marshall glimpse Stalin’s long-term strategy and react successfully to counter Stalin’s final
checkmate move? I believe he did.
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Why did Stalin hate his Spanish political opponents so much that he would
build prisons in Spain to deal with them? Why would Stalin continue to persecute
these Spanish political opponents while planning to leave Spain? Robert C. Tucker,
who wrote the Forward to the book, Stalin’s Letter’s to Molotov, explained that the
people who set off Stalin’s “death-dealing anger and vindictiveness” were those who
interfered with Stalin’s search for glory or contradicted Stalin’s need to be perceived
as a genius.  His Spanish opponents committed both crimes59.
Stalin’s role in the Spanish Civil War should be re-analyzed by first removing
all justifications of manipulating Spanish politics with the goal of changing British
perspectives on the Spanish-left’s elected government to convince the British to
intervene on behalf of the Spanish left. There was no chance that the British would
adopt any policy but that of non-intervention in Spain’s civil war. The Spanish left’s
Republican government complained that this policy was unfair and the League of
Nations promised to reconsider the policy of non-intervention if it proved ineffective,
but the policy held until early 1939 when the British and French governments formally
recognized Franco’s national government.
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Unofficial recognition of Franco’s government came much sooner.  Churchill
was questioned on November 4, 1937 about whether the British government had
recognized Franco’s government. Churchill replied that in order to protect British
nationals and commercial interests, “His Majesty’s Government have entered upon
negotiation of the appointment of agents by them and by General Franco
respectively….” The appointed agent told Franco that they had “…achieved
something leading to the reestablishment of the normal relations”60
Regarding the question of whether Stalin would have ignored British reports
detailing why Britain could not and would not intervene in Spain, consider the
perspective provided by US Military historians. According to these military experts,
the 1930’s were the Soviet Union’s golden age of military thought that involved
careful study of the realities they faced. Stalin used his expert military leaders during
the Spanish Civil War and then had them killed. According to these experts, Stalin
would not have ignored the realities provided in secret reports provided to him by
Soviet spies located in Britain’s foreign office.
Another distraction to remove is Stalin and Hitler’s constant fussing about how
much they hated each other. Instead of focusing on what they disagreed on, look for
what they had in common. Look for what Hitler could gain by being involved in Spain
and what Stalin could gain, then use not just data that both controlled and
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manipulated, but data from other sources combined with a personality analysis of both
to derive what each would most likely do in a given situation.
Something else that should be analyzed is how closely the dates of the
beginning and end of the Stalin purges match those of the beginning and end of the
Spanish Civil War. While many people killed in these purges were not involved in the
Spanish Civil War, it would not be unlike Stalin to use the purges to eliminate
potential opponents while covering his tracks in Spain – the dead leak no secrets.
Analysis of the Spanish Civil War is not treated as critical to understanding WWII, but
if Stalin and Hitler were, as I believe, secretly colluding in Spain to prepare for WWII,
then any secrets they hid during the Spanish Civil War could be significant. Closer
analysis of the Spanish Civil War might be the key to answering many nagging
questions regarding Hitler and Stalin during WWII.
Another area that deserves scholarly research is a comparison of Stalin’s role
and methods in Spain and his role and methods in China. A comparison of complaints
waged by Stalin’s Spanish allies with complaints wages by Chinese communists might
be useful. Is there a pattern? During my research, I ran across some of this information
and there did seem to be similarities, but since this was not my primary area for
research, I did not spend much time looking at the information. I believe, however,
that it deserves attention.
If there are similarities between Stalin’s role and methods in Spain and China,
analyzing this pattern might help decipher Stalin’s long-term strategic plans and how
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